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Debating Ethical Expertise
ABSTRACT. This paper explores the relevance of the debate about ethical ex-
pertise for the practice of clinical ethics. We present definitions, explain three 
theories of ethical expertise, and identify arguments that have been brought up 
to either support the concept of ethical expertise or call it into question. Finally, 
we discuss four theses: the debate is relevant for the practice of clinical ethics in 
that it (1) improves and specifies clinical ethicists’ perception of their expertise; 
(2) contributes to improving the perception of moral competence of non-ethicists; 
(3) gives insight into complementary styles of argumentation of ethicists and 
non-ethicists; and (4) contributes to the awareness of the problem of profession-
building of (clinical) ethicists.
In various areas of professional life, ethicists now serve as experts. They serve as members of government commissions, experts on inter-national business panels, and advisors in individual political consulta-
tion. Ethicists are chairpersons and members of ethics committees. They 
facilitate moral deliberations on hospital wards; give advice to individual 
professionals on how to interpret and manage morally difficult situations; 
and teach ethics to students, interns, and residents. Ethicists also serve as 
expert witnesses in court, especially in the United States (Nussbaum 2002). 
Notwithstanding the significance of the role of ethicists in contemporary 
public life, the concept of ethical expertise has been, and continues to 
be, controversial. Some have asked whether expertise is possible at all in 
relation to moral questions, and, if so, whether it is morally and politi-
cally desirable to credit select individuals with an expert status in these 
questions (Cowley 2005; Varelius 2007).
In this article, we discuss the relevance of the ongoing debate about 
ethical expertise for the practice of clinical ethics. For our analysis, we 
primarily refer to the debate about ethical expertise in peer-reviewed 
journals of medical ethics and clinical ethics. Additionally we refer to 
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publications by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Dreyfus and Dreyfus aim to 
identify a specific human concept of expertise, which they distinguish from 
the type of expertise ascribed to computer expert systems. We find the 
Dreyfus theory relevant for our discussion because of its inherent concept 
of experience-based moral competence, which complements analytical 
theories of expertise in ethical deliberation.
In the following section, we present definitions of expertise and iden-
tify some core arguments for and against the concept of ethical expertise 
in general. Then we explain three theories of expertise in ethics. In the 
next section, we explore the extent to which the debate is relevant for the 
practice of clinical ethics. In the final section, we propose a concept of 
expertise for clinical ethicists.
THE DEBATE ABOUT ETHICAL EXPERTISE
Defining Ethical Expertise
Expertise can be defined as the possession, at a high level, of knowledge 
and skills in a limited subject area, typically in a professional field. In the 
Compact Oxford English Dictionary (2008), it is succinctly defined as “great 
skill or knowledge in a particular field.” The levels of knowledge and skills 
required for “expertise” can be stipulated in professional codes, teaching 
and training programs, and job descriptions. Closely related to expertise is 
the concept of competence. It is a narrower concept, primarily limited to 
the aspect of skill. Competence has been defined as the quality or extent of 
being competent (Compact Oxford English Dictionary 2008), which means 
having the capacity to adequately function or develop in relation to a defined 
class of skills (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary 2008).
The concept of expertise in clinical ethics restricts the formal definition 
to content specific to the clinical environment. According to the formal 
definition of expertise, ethical expertise involves thorough knowledge of 
moral propositions and ethical theories, and the skills to use this knowledge 
in a professional way. As to the material constraints, ethical reflection in 
the clinical setting is primarily problem-oriented. Individual and particular 
aspects play a significant role, except in the development of institutional 
guidelines (Gracia 2003). The clinical setting also imposes time constraints 
on moral deliberation, and in many cases an orientation toward decision 
making. Deliberation in the clinic must come to an end within a prede-
termined timeframe, sometimes even before the best possible arguments 
and conclusions have been found. Readiness to accept the temporality of 
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conclusions and willingness to reassess them belong to the expertise of 
the clinical ethicist as well. Finally, discussions and decisions are shaped 
by interdisciplinary cooperation.
In addition to the formal and material aspects of the definition, we dis-
tinguish between a narrow and a broad sense of ethical expertise. The two 
differentiations are not congruent. In the narrow sense, ethical expertise 
means theoretical reflection of morality within the material side constraints 
of the context. In the broad sense, expertise entails substantial knowledge 
about moral right and wrong, including specific moral conclusions (Singer 
1972; Birnbacher 1999; Weinstein 1994). In our discussion, we refer to 
the term “ethical expertise” primarily in the narrow sense. We thereby 
include both the formal and material aspects of the definition.
We use the terms ethicist and clinical ethicist to describe a professional 
function for which training in ethics is required. Clinical ethicists can be 
either clinicians or nonclinicians. For the purpose of our argument, it is 
essential that in performing the tasks of an ethicist, be it in ethical case 
deliberation or ethics consultation, the ethicist’s role and responsibility 
differ from that of a clinician who is involved in the care of a patient.
Arguments Against Ethical Expertise
Critics have argued that ethical expertise is a flawed idea, both for concep-
tual and for moral reasons. Conceptually, it has been argued either that moral 
judgment is not based on facts (Scofield 1993), or that consensus among 
ethicists has not been, or cannot be, achieved. The general premise of the 
conceptual critique is that there can only be expertise in a field if an expert’s 
propositions meet a pre-defined standard of truth, and that this standard 
needs to be based either on the correspondence between propositions and 
factual conditions, or on the consensus among practitioners in the field.
In the lack-of-factual-basis argument, the presupposed standard of truth 
is correspondence between a proposition and a factual condition in the real 
world. A proposition is determined as true if and only if it corresponds to 
a condition in reality. Critics of ethical expertise hold that in propositions 
about morality such correspondence is lacking; that therefore such proposi-
tions cannot be true; and that in sum, according to this line of reasoning, 
there simply is no ethical expertise. For example, Christopher Cowley (2005) 
argues that moral propositions represent individual personal evaluations 
rather than factual conditions. Besides, in the debate about the fact-value 
dichotomy, it has been argued that normative and factual statements are 
related to reality in different—prescriptive and descriptive—ways.
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In the lack-of-consensus-argument, consensus among ethicists is an 
essential presupposition of moral truth. According to the general prem-
ise of this argument, there cannot be expertise unless ethicists can reach 
consensus. The specific premise is that such a consensus either does not 
exist, that it has never existed, or, in the strictest version of the argument, 
that consensus among ethicists cannot exist on principle. Similar to the 
lack-off-factual-basis argument, the conclusion at least in the case of the 
strictest form of the argument is that due to the lack of consensus ethical 
expertise does not exist.
Bruce Weinstein (1994) calls the general premises of both versions of 
the argument into question. In his view, neither correspondence between 
moral propositions and facts nor consensus among ethicists can be made 
a precondition for ethical expertise. Instead, Weinstein suggests that, as 
long as experts are able to give strong justifications for moral judgments, 
neither the argument of disagreement nor the argument of lack of a factual 
basis are sufficiently valid to refuse them expert status. Hence, following 
Weinstein’s argument, ethical expertise is possible regardless of dissent 
among ethicists about moral judgments, either in fact or in principle. In-
stead, the coherence of moral arguments with philosophical background 
theories is considered a sufficient criterion of truth.
Furthermore, it has been argued that in other professional fields with a 
similar lack of correspondence or consensus, expertise is conceded all the 
same (Varelius 2007). For example, juridical expertise is hardly doubted 
even though judicial propositions are not exclusively based on facts either 
and, except for the factual agreement of written law, consensus among 
juridical scholars is hardly more prevalent than in ethics. Besides, in tech-
nical and scientific expertise, correspondence between facts and proposi-
tions can be lacking as well. For example, Karl Popper’s (2002) method 
of falsification demonstrates that the truth of scientific facts and theories 
can only be tentatively approximated. Philosophers of science have shown 
that both facts and scientific theories can be subjects of construction. Ac-
cording to Giles Scofield (2008), a specific shortcoming regarding ethical 
expertise is that bioethicists have insufficiently delivered specific standards 
of expertise, especially for consultation. Whereas for Scofield himself, this 
is a sufficient reason to reject ethics consultation altogether, we argue that 
its potential and limitations should be defined within a discourse about 
professionalism and the underlying concepts of (clinical) ethics.
In a moral reasoning critique of ethical expertise, some authors have 
argued that the concept of ethical expertise should be rejected because 
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of its alleged immoral and disadvantageous implications (Noble 1982; 
Loughlin 2002; Scofield 1993; 2008). One of the most fervent adherents 
of such morally inspired critique, British philosopher Michael Loughlin 
(2002), holds that by fulfilling expectations of the “buyers” of ethical ad-
vice, bioethicists undermine critical philosophical reflection upon the status 
quo and prevent it from being applied in healthcare organizations.
As to the broader social and political implications of the concept, 
University of South Florida affiliated philosopher Stephen Turner (2001, 
p. 123) argues that ethical expertise generates two problems for liberal 
democracies: first, it may introduce inequalities into societies of equal 
citizens, and second, it poses a problem for state neutrality because opin-
ions of experts and scientists are publicly given an elevated and privileged 
status above the opinions above non-experts. Such inequalities, especially 
when granting a special status to ethicists, are considered morally unac-
ceptable (Noble 1982).
A modified version of the moral argument rests on the supposition that 
ethical expertise contradicts the assumption that everyone’s insight into mo-
rality is equally essential and valid. However, it can be argued that this type 
of contradiction can be avoided and that it is not an essential consequence 
of the supposition of ethical expertise. For example, Theo van Willigenburg 
(1999) has pointed out that an ethicist should not give advice without clearly 
indicating the ethical justifications upon which the advice is based. Trans-
parency and the preparedness to give reasons and to explain the meaning 
of one’s arguments prevents ethicists from becoming mere neutral observers 
on the one hand or preachers of moral conclusions on the other.
Theories of Ethical Expertise
Beyond controversial arguments about conceptual and moral flaws of 
the concept, the debate about ethical expertise has generated some more 
elaborate suggestions as to its integration into professional contexts. We 
present three theories of ethical expertise as examples: Weinstein’s (1993; 
1994) analytical theory of ethical expertise; the phenomenological account 
of ethical expertise elaborated by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1990; 1991; 2004); 
and reflections about expertise in clinical ethics by David Casarett and 
colleagues (Casarett, Daskal, and Lantos 1998).
Weinstein first presents a general concept of expertise, without reference 
to ethics. He differentiates between epistemic and performative expertise. 
Epistemic expertise refers to someone’s capacity to provide strong justifica-
tions for theoretical claims. A justification is strong when it substantiates 
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a claim with sound reasons. A statement is an expert statement when it is 
made within a limited domain for which the expert has specialist educa-
tion and training. Performative expertise is the ability to perform a task 
well (Weinstein 1994).
In the realm of ethics, Weinstein connects the concept of epistemic ex-
pertise to the analytical differentiation between descriptive, normative, and 
metaethics (Weinstein 1994). Of these three categories, descriptive and me-
taethical expertise seem to be less controversial. It is easily comprehensible 
that expertise is required to write a historical study about moral attitudes, 
or a philosophical interpretation of the meaning of moral concepts. The 
most relevant and controversial part of Weinstein’s theory refers to nor-
mative ethical expertise. As normative reasoning is closely associated with 
substantial moral conclusions and relatively loosely connected to factual 
conditions, critics doubt the existence of this kind of expertise in ethics.
Against his critics, Weinstein holds that epistemic ethical expertise ex-
ists and that it is a sound concept even if and when factual disagreement 
remains among those who are labeled experts. He argues that neither 
disagreement about the relevance and interpretation of data nor dissent 
about ethical background theories alone can undermine the expert sta-
tus of ethicists. Assuming that the concept of strong justification—as a 
criterion of normative epistemic expertise—means the degree to which a 
judgment coheres with an author’s philosophical background assumptions, 
the existence of factual consensus becomes obsolete as a criterion of truth 
(Weinstein 1994, p. 69).
Coherence between different levels of ethical judgment is considered 
a necessary and sufficient condition for ethical expertise, not consensus 
among ethicists about what the true facts, background theories, and 
conclusions are. The existence of ethical expertise as a sound concept 
is further supported by concise methodology in argumentation. Finally, 
ethical expertise depends on the existence of reason in connection with 
the assumption that moral judgment has an objective status, and that it 
is not merely subjective opinion.
For Weinstein, performative ethical expertise is defined as the practical 
ability to live a morally good life. Whereas according to his theory it is 
considered an integral component of a broader concept of ethical exper-
tise, we argue that the ability to live a morally good life should not be 
considered an integral part of expertise in clinical ethics. For knowledge 
and skills to be qualified as a particular professional expertise, there need 
to be more objective criteria that are independent of the moral integrity 
of individual subjects. For the moment, a narrow concept of professional 
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expertise in clinical ethics leaves the questions of practical moral compe-
tence open and unanswered.
For a further clarification, we consider the theory of ethical expertise 
offered by Dreyfus and Dreyfus relevant. This theory presents an ap-
proach to what we refer to as moral competence. The authors give a 
phenomenological account of ethical expertise (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1991; 2004). Unlike Weinstein, they explicitly do not refer to expertise 
in ethical deliberation. The core of their theory is the internalized abil-
ity of a moral agent to deal intuitively with substantial moral questions, 
rather than the capacity of a professionally trained expert to give strong 
justifications for ethical propositions supported by Weinstein. Therefore, 
we argue that the actual subject of their theory refers to the faculty of 
substantial moral judgment independent of trained expertise, which we 
define as moral competence.
At the time of its first publication, the analysis aimed to identify a type 
of expertise that is characteristically human, in contrast to the computer 
navigated expertise in electronic expert systems (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). 
The theory is based upon three presuppositions: (1) a phenomenological 
account of ethical expertise primarily describes everyday moral coping (as 
differentiated from ethical deliberation); (2) for the purpose of a clear de-
marcation of the theory’s subject area, one must determine at which point 
and under which conditions moral coping turns into ethical deliberation 
and rational choice; and (3) the structure of ethical deliberation should not 
be read into everyday moral coping (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991; 2004).
Dreyfus and Dreyfus identify five stages of expertise acquisition. They 
argue that this division into five stages is equally valid for the development 
of any form of practical capability, including moral coping in particular. At 
the beginning of the learning process, individuals are thought to be fully 
ignorant of the knowledge and skills, which they are supposed to acquire. 
In the first stage, the acquisition of moral coping is guided by de-contex-
tualized moral principles. Moral principles summarize and demonstrate 
basic elements and experience of morality. In the following stages, aspects 
of real situations in which moral problems occur are added. For the learner 
of morality, principles increasingly lose their guiding function. Instead, 
he or she needs to learn how to deal with everyday moral problems in a 
step-by-step process towards greater complexity. At the highest level of 
expertise acquisition, abstract principles are abandoned altogether. The 
morally mature person is thought to be able to grasp directly and intuitively 
an individual situation, to recognize its morally salient features, and to 
know what ought to be done (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991).
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The theory’s main methodological presupposition resembles John 
Dancy’s moral particularism in that it assumes that an unprincipled direct 
view of the singular situation is preferable to a view mediated by theoretical 
abstractions. According to Dancy, an unprincipled ethical view provides 
better access to the complexity of concrete moral problems in specific 
situations than is possible with a view that is biased by ethical principles 
(Dancy 1993; Harris 2003). However, in contrast to Dancy’s theory, which 
refers to ethical deliberation and moral judgment, Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s 
theory exclusively focuses on moral coping and the intuitive grasping of 
morally problematic situations. In our view, this feature makes Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus’s concept apt as a theoretical instrument to explore the moral 
thinking of non-ethicists. It conceives an undisguised view of practical 
situations and supports the view that moral understanding in professional 
practice is not filtered by abstract ethical concepts in advance, but rather 
developed in interaction with professional practice itself.
The third theory, framed by Casarett and coauthors, focuses on the 
interrelationship between the deliberation and facilitation of ethicists and 
the moral consideration, judgment, and decision making of non-ethicists 
(Casarett, Daskal, and Lantos 1998). Casarett and colleagues focus on 
the authority of the clinical ethics consultant. In general, there are three 
views on the tasks and responsibilities of clinical ethicists. According to 
the first view, a clinical ethicist or ethics consultant is expected to provide 
strong justifications for moral judgments, analogous to a medical special-
ist who suggests rationales for particular treatments (Jonsen, Siegler, and 
Winslade 2006). On the second view, the clinical ethicist is primarily a 
moderator who facilitates deliberations within ethics committees (a stable 
group with written statutes and agendas) or among a team of healthcare 
providers when facing a difficult situation on the ward (a transient group, 
tied together by responsibility for a particular patient in a specific situation) 
(Finns, Bacchetta, and Miller 1997). The third view aims to combine both 
advisory and facilitative tasks (Steinkamp and Gordijn 2001). According 
to Casarett and colleagues, responsibility for moral reasoning and support 
of non-ethicists in decision making are both part of the clinical ethicist’s 
professional responsibility. In their view, ethicist and non-ethicist need to 
interact with each other. This view has gained acceptance in clinical eth-
ics nowadays, including within some important umbrella organizations. 
For example, in its ethics facilitation approach, the American Society of 
Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) counts both advising and facilitating 
as core competencies of ethics consultants (ASBH 1998). The Royal Col-
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lege of Physicians (2005) in Great Britain stresses that consultation and 
facilitation belong to the core activities of clinical ethics. In the light of 
Casarett and colleague’s concept of expertise in clinical ethics, what has 
been proclaimed by the ASBH as ethics facilitation approach not only is 
a middle position between ethics consultation on the one hand, and pure 
facilitation on the other, but should be further elaborated as an integra-
tion of ethical expertise and moral competence in a specific organizational 
form of clinical ethics.
Casarett and colleagues argue not only that advising and facilitating both 
belong to a clinical ethicist’s responsibilities, but also that both of these 
responsibilities must be considered as genuine forms of ethical expertise 
(Casarett, Daskal, and Lantos 1998). Referring to Jürgen Habermas’s 
(1990) discourse theory of ethics, the truth of a moral norm can be estab-
lished by the building, and testing, of acceptance among all moral subjects 
who are potentially affected by the consequences of general compliance 
with it. An important goal of this process is consensus. Discourse is a 
means to reach such consensus. Assuming this theoretical presupposition, 
ethical case deliberation formally becomes a variety of discourse to test 
the truth of norms and judgments. Of course this is not the primary func-
tion of ethical case deliberation in clinical practice, but formally it can be 
considered as an aspect that makes the guiding of ethical case deliberation 
more than just a technique of facilitation. In our view, however, consensus 
is first and foremost a factual goal of ethical case deliberation, but not a 
sufficient criterion for the rightness of a moral conclusion. The full mean-
ing of ethical case deliberation itself, finally, can best be understood by 
consideration of the material constraints that determine its specific shape, 
together with the formal dimension of expertise.
To summarize the three theories presented here: Weinstein shows that 
expertise in ethics has both a theoretical (epistemic) and a practical (per-
formative) dimension. Dreyfus and Dreyfus provide a phenomenological 
interpretation of everyday moral coping. In our view, their concept is an 
explanation of moral competence of non-ethicists rather than a theory of 
ethical expertise. Casarett, Daskal, and Lantos develop a theory of ethical 
expertise specifically for clinical ethics, in which the advisory as well as 
facilitative responsibilities of an ethicist are identified as parts of ethical 
expertise. Furthermore, this last theory indicates a way of interaction, in 
clinical ethics, between ethical expertise (of ethicists) and moral compe-
tence (of non-ethicists).
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RELEVANCE OF THE DEBATE FOR THE PRACTICE OF CLINICAL ETHICS
In this section, we discuss the extent to which the debate about ethical 
expertise is relevant for the practice of clinical ethics. We argue that it is 
relevant in that (1) it facilitates the appreciation of ethical expertise and 
strengthens clinical ethicists’ professional self-perception; (2) it implies an 
improved appreciation of the moral competence of non-ethicists, which, 
next to ethical expertise, has been identified as a complementary concept 
of expertise in the realm of reflection about moral problems; (3) it pro-
vides methodical hints for structured cooperation between ethicists and 
nonethicists by giving insight into the complementarity of their styles of 
argumentation; and (4) it sharpens awareness of the problem of profes-
sion-building among ethicists.
Ethical Expertise of Clinical Ethicists
Expectations concerning ethical expertise are divergent. Some assume 
that an ethical expert should be able to answer any kind of moral question 
and solve any moral problem. Others are skeptical because of the sup-
posed conceptual and moral inadequacies associated with ethical expertise 
and, accordingly, because they believe that an ethicist lacks any ability to 
solve substantial moral questions. In our view, to clarify such divergent 
expectations, the notion of ethical expertise needs to be further speci-
fied. Turner (2001) has argued that a mere intellectualist idea of ethical 
expertise may fall short of the complexity of moral problems, especially 
in professional contexts. An intellectualist notion of expertise means that 
the concept is reduced to a method of argumentation that employs ele-
ments of ethical theory—values, principles, norms, and virtues—to solve 
moral problems. This notion reflects what we have defined as the narrow 
concept of ethical expertise, which represents (a selection of) specific 
capabilities of ethicists.
For the development of an adequate notion of ethical expertise, which 
lives up to the complexity of moral problems and is differentiated from 
substantial moral competence, a clarification of the roles and responsibili-
ties of ethicists in professional contexts may be helpful. As to the clinical 
ethicist, two contrasting roles have been distinguished, namely (1) the 
ethicist as observer who is responsible for the formal analysis of moral 
problems and ethical arguments and therefore who keeps a distance and 
remains detached from the moral problems to be analyzed, and (2) the 
ethicist as moral problem solver who gets involved and gives substantial 
advice as to what ought to be done.
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Scepticism and critique have been directed predominantly at the idea 
of the ethicist as problem solver. For example, Alfred Ayer (1954) argues 
that training in moral philosophy is not a sufficient preparation for the 
work of an ethicist, or even to improve a person’s insight into the moral 
virtues. Such critique of substantial ethical expertise in the broad sense 
forms the background for Weinstein’s limitation of the idea of epistemic 
ethical expertise. According to his argumentation, it is only requisite that 
an expert can give strong justifications for propositions. Expertise does 
not entail the capability to determine substantially right conclusions.
The arguments in favor of a limitation of the concept of ethical expertise 
to the analytical and methodological dimension seem to be based on the 
following three suppositions. First, ethicists lack the competence to answer 
substantial moral questions within a complex professional context that 
is not their own. Second, objectivity in ethics is more limited than objec-
tivity in other intellectual disciplines, for example in science, technology, 
or jurisprudence. Third, the autonomy and independence of nonethicists 
would be constricted if a broad concept of ethical expertise—including 
substantial moral conclusions—were maintained.
The narrow concept of ethical expertise has been criticized as well. 
Cheryl Noble (1982) and Loughlin (2002) argue that of the idea of ethical 
expertise triggers the idea that difficult moral problems can be “solved” 
by means of a simple application of methods of ethical argumentation. 
Indeed, some models of ethical argumentation and application may be 
considered simplistic. For example, some theories in early bioethics hand-
books are designed to solve moral questions by application of principles 
and norms in a top-down manner (cf. Fox and Swazey 2005; Beauchamp 
and Childress 1979; 1982; 1989). Later, more complex and subtle methods 
of relating ethical theory to moral problems indicate a growing insight into 
the complexity of “applied” moral questions. In addition to the deductive 
application of principles and norms, bioethicists subsequently have used 
inductive methods, as well as specification or balancing, and have created 
approaches of greater complexity (Richardson 1990; 2000; Beauchamp 
and Childress 1994; 2001; see Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade 2006).
In current clinical ethics literature, similar advanced views on delibera-
tive methods are being maintained. In different types of situations, one can 
choose from a variety of methods and protocols of ethical case deliberation 
(Steinkamp and Gordijn 2003). For example, Clinical Pragmatism is a 
method modeled after John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy (Fins, Miller, 
and Bacchetta 1997). A major reason for its development was the insight 
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that deductive application of principles is an insufficient method for the 
analysis of morally difficult clinical cases. Ethical norms and principles 
come into view only after a thorough analysis and interpretation of a 
situation. Also in other methods, both decision-oriented and reflective (or 
interpretative), moral norms and principles are relevant points of orienta-
tion during the course of ethical argumentation. However, explicitly they 
are only referred to relatively late in the discussion and only as a second 
order reference point of deliberation (Steinkamp and Gordijn 2003).
The phenomenon of ethical case deliberation shows how a narrow 
concept of ethical expertise can be broadened without causing the ethical 
expert to abandon his or her productive distant and analytical perspec-
tive. Relying on methods of ethical argumentation alone is not enough to 
solve substantial moral questions, even if these methods are adequately 
complex and sophisticated. Therefore, we argue that it is advantageous to 
provide structures that guarantee the possibility of complementary inter-
action between ethical expertise (of ethicists) and moral competence (of 
(non-ethicist) healthcare providers). We think that a carefully implemented 
ethics committee in connection with ethical case deliberation on the ward 
can be developed further into elements of such a structure.
To further illustrate the limitations of a narrow concept of ethical 
expertise, Madison Powers criticizes Jeremy Bentham, who presumed it 
is possible to solve moral quandaries by means of a technique of moral 
argumentation independent of political and juridical circumstances. Ac-
cording to Powers (2005, p. 306),
the emphasis on methods of bioethics and the public reliance on the pre-
sumed moral expertise of bioethicists runs the risk of making Bentham’s 
mistake of failing to appreciate that what is at stake under such circum-
stances are substantive disagreements on the good life for individuals and 
the proper ends of government within a good social order.
Bentham’s mistake, Powers maintains, consists in the fact that he “un-
derestimated the depth of disagreement in his own time, and (that) he 
falsely assumed that technical refinements in practical ethics can spare 
one from the inherently political dimension of moral argument” (Powers 
2005, p. 320).
Considering Powers’s analysis of Bentham, we argue that the narrow 
concept of ethical expertise, which has turned out to be the more adequate 
concept to represent the expertise of ethicists, should be related to the con-
cept of moral competence of non-ethicists. Involving moral competence and 
aligning it to the expertise of the ethicist means that in a structural way, 
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moral intuitions, judgments, valuations, and interests of moral subjects in 
healthcare organizations can be taken seriously. The purpose of relating 
ethical expertise and moral competence to each other is to facilitate the 
ability of healthcare providers to bring in their professional competence 
into the reflection and deliberation about moral problems, and structurally 
to relate the ethicist and his or her expertise to professional practice while 
maintaining the strength of a distant analytical perspective.
For the practice of clinical ethics, one can conclude that ethical expertise 
requires an adequate balance of detachment and involvement, and that 
this balance can be provided when there is both a distinction and coopera-
tion between ethicists (and their ethical expertise) and non-ethicists (and 
their moral competence). In cooperation, ethicists will focus primarily on 
the analysis of moral questions (cf. Birnbacher 1999), reasoning, and the 
process of deliberation, rather than on the determination of what finally 
ought to be done. Non-ethicists, instead, will receive the support necessary 
to bring in the best possible knowledge about morally relevant practical 
details in determining the decisions to be taken.
Moral Competence of Non-Ethicists
According to the definition offered by Peter A. Singer, Edmund Pel-
legrino, and Marc Siegler (1990; 2001), the main goal of clinical ethics 
is to improve the quality of patient care by identifying, analyzing, and 
attempting to resolve the ethical problems that arise in practice. Refer-
ring to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, it could be shown that moral competence 
prior to ethical reflection plays a significant role when moral problems 
are to be approached. Therefore, appreciation and improvements in the 
perception not only of professional ethical expertise, but also of moral 
competence, its role and significance in ethical argumentation, may im-
prove the cooperation between ethicists and non-ethicists, contribute to a 
better understanding of moral problems in clinical practice, render moral 
questions more readily answerable, and raise the acceptability of—jointly 
developed—answers to moral problems encountered in clinical practice.
One way to better understand and appreciate the moral competence 
of healthcare professionals is to explore their moral views and attitudes 
through empirical research. For example, Kathleen Oberle and Dorothee 
Hughes (2001) have revealed that there are differences in the way that 
doctors and nurses perceive moral problems and in the way they com-
municate about them. According to Oberle and Hughes, these differences 
depend, among other things, on the function and on the respective pro-
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fessional roles of these healthcare professionals. Empirical studies about 
morality, however, may deliver more informative results when conceived 
as continuation of prior conceptual investigation. According to George 
Agich (1994), before empirical research on moral attitudes can be done, 
a suitable research question and methodology should be designed in line 
with conceptual ethical parameters.
Therefore, a second way to investigate moral competence consists of 
a clarification of its meaning and an investigation of its function in non-
ethicists by theoretical reflection. Casarett and colleagues argue that the 
facilitation of ethical deliberation, in ethics committees as well as team 
deliberation on the ward, should be considered an integral part of ethical 
expertise, not only as a technique of consensus formation (Casarett, Daskal 
and Lantos 1998; Widdershoven 1999). A more elaborate theoretical ex-
ploration of moral competence is found in Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s account, 
which we already discussed. The aim of moral competence acquisition 
according to Dreyfus and Dreyfus is to grasp difficult situations intuitively, 
without the support of norms and principles.
As a result of Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s argument, better insight into moral 
competence, as well as a careful analysis of this concept, not only amplifies 
the role of non-ethicists in clinical ethics, it also reveals that ethicists and 
non-ethicists may employ divergent styles of ethical argumentation and 
that this divergence and the complementarity of styles of argumentation 
bring out the strength of both sides. The moral competence of non-ethicist 
professionals does not involve explicit reflection about ethical notions and 
arguments, but lies in the competence to deal with the moral particularities 
of a situation that occurs within a particular professional field. Further 
research is necessary to explore how interaction between moral perception 
and normative ethical argumentation can be initiated and improved.
Complementary Styles of Argumentation
We have argued that the interaction and cooperation between ethicists 
and non-ethicists is necessary given the complexity of moral problems in 
the clinic and the fact that those moral problems may include substantive 
disagreements about the good life. Furthermore, we have argued that in 
such cooperation it would be advantageous if ethicists focus primarily 
on the analysis of moral questions and moral reasons as well as on the 
facilitation of deliberation, and not on the determination of what ought 
to be done. Non-ethicists, instead, should receive the support necessary 
for them to verbalize morally relevant aspects of situations in practice, 
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articulate moral quandaries from their professional practice, and take 
responsibility for the decisions to be made.
To elaborate on the complementarity between ethicist and non-ethicist, 
we have distinguished between different styles of argumentation. We have 
exemplified these different styles by presenting Weinstein’s analysis of 
epistemic ethical expertise on the one hand, and Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s 
account of moral competence on the other. According to Weinstein, ap-
proaching moral problems requires reference to analytical ethical justi-
fications. Healthcare professionals, patients, and all others who are not 
ethicists instead will start their moral considerations with a quasi-intuitive 
perception of particular situations.
Hence, within a complementary and interactive concept of clinical 
ethics, ethical expertise can focus on the knowledge and ability of ethical 
deliberation in a narrow sense, in order to utilize its inherent potential of 
critical distancing and detached reflection. Moral competence, instead, can 
focus on the internalized faculty of judgment, based on the expertise of 
healthcare providers in their professional field, and with the profession’s 
internal morality (Brody and Miller 1998). Both ethicists and non-ethicists 
should be encouraged to employ a style of thinking and argumentation 
that brings out the strongest traits of everyone’s training, experience, 
expertise, and role-related responsibility.
Particularly in ethical case deliberation, direct interaction between 
ethicists and non-ethicists is prevalent. Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
evaluate methods of ethical case deliberation with respect to how partici-
pants are encouraged to unfold their respective styles of argumentation. 
For example, according to established methods, a case deliberation starts 
with a determination and inventory of the moral problem. This first step 
is pre-deliberative in so far as it aims to map the moral intuitions and 
judgments that come to the fore when healthcare professionals ponder 
about a practical decision. The healthcare professional and his or her 
moral sense are at the center.
Only after an exploration of the content of this moral sense, does 
the decision-making process become more deliberative and reflective. 
According to Weinstein’s theory, a part of such deliberation is based on 
Anglo-American analytical ethics. However, as the example of Nijmegen 
method and other methods shows, elements of hermeneutic methods can 
be used alongside the normative elements of ethical theory. What seems 
crucial is a cooperative practice of the complementary styles of argumen-
tation between ethicist and non-ethicist and that the deliberative process 
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is organized in a way that the different styles can be practiced to advance 
the team’s deliberation.
Profession Building
Some authors who reject the idea of ethical expertise have criticized the 
concept of profession building in ethics as well, for basically the same reasons 
that have been brought forward against the concept of ethical expertise: 
namely that moral propositions lack a firm empirical basis, that consensus 
between experts is not available, and that ethical expertise undermines the 
autonomy of those who receive an ethicist’s advice. For example, Giles 
Scofield (1993) argues that, in order to build a profession, an indisputable 
concept of expertise should be available for the discipline in question.
Other authors point to the possibility that ethicists, due to the lack of 
reliable criteria for argumentation and evaluation, may be particularly 
prone to instrumentalization, for example by employers and clients (see, 
e.g., Noble 1982; Scofield 1993). Loughlin especially takes a radical 
position and argues that the mere existence of the discipline of bioethics 
and of a profession of ethicists creates an illusion that critical reflection 
takes place. To substantiate his claim, he points to simplistic answers 
that ethicists supposedly have given to moral questions. Furthermore, he 
argues that an applied discipline like bioethics will undermine the critical 
potential of philosophical thinking (Loughlin 2002).
Jan Crosthwaite (1995, p. 365) has pointed out that such fundamental 
critique may have a positive effect on the quality of ethical expertise. For 
example, scrutiny from the side of critics may improve critical (self-)aware-
ness of the skill base of ethicists and may foster alertness to the ways in which 
background theories, assumptions, and interests influence the framing of 
moral questions (see Animasaun 2006, p. 42). Furthermore, critique leads 
to the perception of, and discussion about, the necessity of decent criteria of 
admission to the profession as well their acceptance among its members.
Answering both to the critique and to perceived shortcomings in bio-
medical ethics, Eric Loewy and Roberta Loewy (2005) resume an older 
debate and argue that, considering the responsibility of professional 
ethicists, it is important to build up and establish bioethics as a profes-
sion. Their pragmatic arguments are, first, that general binding standards 
could be developed and used when deciding who should get access to the 
professional group. Second, once he or she is a member of the profession, 
monitoring and supervising of the ethicist’s functioning and integrity could 
be demanded. Third, standards of teaching and training, including learning 
goals and methods, could be agreed upon with greater comparability.
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Loewy and Loewy (2005, pp. 76ff.) argue that such a self-regulation 
should comply with the following conditions: (1) a profession must have 
a moral—as opposed to merely a technical—end; (2) a profession must 
serve the public good; (3) members of a profession have to be knowledge-
able in a prescribed number of subject areas; (4) a body of theoretical 
underpinnings and formal mechanism of access into the profession needs 
to be established; (5) a profession establishes its own criteria of profes-
sionalism; (6) mechanisms have to be established to guarantee compliance 
with criteria of professionalism; and (7) a profession must be self-policing. 
Referring to the discussion about regulation of healthcare ethics commit-
tees (Steinkamp et. al. 2007), self-regulation of ethicists can be a first step 
toward a broader concept of societal regulation of the profession that is 
adequate regarding its responsibility. Societal regulation may remain mod-
erate as long as both critical independence of the profession and accepted 
standards of responsibility and accountability can be warranted.
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the relevance of the debate about ethical expertise 
for the practice of clinical ethics considering four points. First, during the 
debate, specified ideas about the clinical ethicist’s role, responsibility, and 
expertise have come to the fore. For example, those arguments that support 
a narrow, rather than a broad, concept of expertise seem to be the most 
adequate. At the same time, moral competence forms an experience-based 
complement on the side of health care providers. We argue that clinical 
ethicists’ perception of their own expertise can be informed by this debate, 
with the aim of a further specification of criteria of ethical expertise.
Second, we argue that the debate contributes to a better perception 
and appreciation of the moral competence of non-ethicists by allocating 
them a genuine responsibility in clinical ethics, first and foremost as par-
ticipants of ethical case deliberation on the ward, but also as members of 
ethics committees. Third, based on Weinstein’s and Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s 
theoretical sketches of ethical expertise and moral competence, different 
styles of argumentation can be identified for ethicists and non-ethicists. 
Considering their different functions, roles, and responsibilities, it should 
be advantageous when ethicists and non-ethicists refer to their respective 
style of argumentation in ethics deliberation in the clinical context. Health 
care professionals may first and foremost focus on their acquired compe-
tence to intuitively grasp the specifics of a morally problematic situation. 
Referring to a case analysis based on this competence, an ethicist then may 
employ methods of hermeneutic and normative ethical reasoning as well as 
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facilitation, in order to guide moral reflection and decision making among 
health care providers. In this sense, the styles of argumentation of ethicists 
and non-ethicists are complementary. Finally we argue that profession 
building and the development of more specific criteria for expertise of ethi-
cists is a still unfulfilled task. The debate about ethical expertise provides 
some helpful suggestions to continue this discussion. Important tasks will 
be to develop more specific concepts of key qualifications that should be 
required from a clinical ethicist, to analyze existing training programs to 
determine whether they are sufficient to acquire these qualifications, and, 
if necessary, to enhance these programs and to establish new ones.
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